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Abstract
This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of choices in a setting where a
decision-maker may not fully internalize all the consequences of her choices on herself.
Such a departure from rationality, it turns out, is common across a variety of positive
behavioral models and admits the standard rational choice model as a special case. We
show that choice data satisfying (a) Sens axioms  and  fully characterize behavioral
decisions, and (b) Sens axiom  and  fully characterize standard decision-making. In
addition, we show that (a) it is possible to identify a minimal and a maximal set of
psychological states using choice data alone, and (b) under specic choice scenarios,
"revealed mistakes" can be inferred directly from choice data.
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1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence that certain intrinsic features of decision-making environ-
ments, assumed to be normatively irrelevant in a conventional account of rationality, do
a¤ect choices in systematic ways. Deadlines, default options, frames, reference points, as-
pirations, goals, states of mind, emotions and mood are some examples of such features.
Evidence from psychology and economics shows instances in which such features, far
from being exogenous parameters of the environment, are in fact endogenous. For example,
people can control their emotions, state of mind and mood (e.g. Baron, 2008), can self-
impose deadlines (e.g. Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002), can limit their focus as a self-control
device (e.g. Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000) or set a goal to increase their own performance
(e.g. Heath et al., 1999). For expositional convenience, in what follows, we will label such
features of the decision-making environment as psychological states i.e. as any normatively
relevant feature of the environment that the DM may (mistakenly) not internalize at the
moment the decision is made. We broadly interpret psychological states to include reference
points, emotions, temptations, mood, states of mind, goals, aspirations, etc.
A relevant question for positive and normative economics is whether or not people
internalize the impact of their choices on psychological states. We distinguish between
two types of decision-makers (hereafter DMs). Rational DMs are those who internalize
these features and hence choose optimally, and behavioral DMs who systematically, and
mistakenly, behave as if these (normatively relevant) psychological states were exogenous
to their choices.
The evidence in favour of behavioral (boundedly rational) DMs is vast. For example,
we know that people systematically tend to stay at a default option even when they report
it is not in their best interest;1 take actions in the heat of the momentthat they would
not have otherwise intended to take (Loewenstein, 1996); fail to quit smoking even though
they report that it is what they should do;2 mispredict the utility derived from future
1Two-thirds of survey respondents at one company reported that their current savings rate was too low
relative to their ideal savings rate. A third of these undersavers said they were planning to increase their
savings plan contribution rate in the next two months, but almost none of them actually did so (Choi et al.,
2006)
270% of smokers in the U.S. report that they want to quit. Moreover, 41% temporarily stopped smoking
2
consumption (e.g. Loewenstein et al., 2003), overestimate the utility of future income (e.g.
Easterlin, 2001) or underestimate the e¤ect of the price of add-ons (e.g. ink of a printer)
when buying a base good (e.g. printer) (e.g. Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). An array of
di¤erent models in the literature on behavioral economics have been constructed to account
for this evidence and predict systematic suboptimal behavior in specic decision-making
environments.3
While each of these behavioral models accounts for a specic departure from rationality
over a xed domain of fundamentals (preferences, action sets), little is known about the
general properties of the choices which are consistent with these models. Do behavioral
models, as a class, have some general choice-theoretic structure? Do they impose (also
as a class) any restrictions on choice data and if so, which ones? Can we extract any
relevant normative information about psychological states from choices? Can we use choices
to identify mistakes?
The purpose of this paper is to take a rst step in addressing the above questions. We
begin by proposing a general framework of individual decision-making that is a reduced
form representation of a number of di¤erent models of decision-making. Crucially, in our
framework, we allow for standard decision-making (corresponding to rational choice) and
behavioral decision-making (corresponding to boundedly rational choice). We provide an
axiomatic characterization of choice data consistent with behavioral and standard decision-
making. Finally, we construct a scenario where it is possible to identify mistakes from choice
data alone i.e. infer "revealed mistakes".
In our framework, the DM chooses among mutually exclusive actions. Each action has
an e¤ect on payo¤s both directly and indirectly through its e¤ect on a psychological state,
via a feedback function. The DMs preferences rank both actions and psychological states
which are in turn, determined by actions: in e¤ect, following Harsanyi (1954), we assume
that there is intrapersonal comparability of utility.
for a day or more during the previous twelve months in an unsuccessful attempt to quit (Beshears et al.,
2008). Smokers according to their own evaluation, consider themselves to be better o¤ if smoking was
restricted by a tax (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005),
3Some examples are models of projection bias (Loewenstein et al., 2003), cognitive dissonance (Akerlof
and Dickens, 1982), emotions (Bracha and Brown, 2007) or self-control problems (Loewenstein, 1996). Other
relevant papers are referred to in Section 3.3 below.
3
We consider two types of decision procedures: a Standard Decision Procedure (SDP)
and Behavioral Decision Procedure (BDP). In a SDP, the DM fully internalizes the feedback
from actions to psychological states, and chooses an action that maximizes his welfare: this
is equivalent to rational decision-making. In a BDP, in contrast, a (behavioral) DM fails to
internalize the e¤ect of his action on his psychological state, and chooses an action taking
as given his psychological state (although psychological states and actions are required to
be mutually consistent at a BDP outcome): this is a form of boundedly rational decision-
making.
Despite its simplicity, our framework is general enough to unify seemingly disconnected
models in the literature, from more recent positive behavioral economics models to older
ones. In addition, it encompasses the standard rational model as a special case (SDP).
Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of choice data compatible with BDPs
and SDPs. It turns out, surprisingly, that three axioms in Sen (1971), axioms ,  and
, are all that is needed to characterize choice data compatible with a SDP and a BDP
respectively. Axiom ; which was also introduced by Cherno¤ (1954), states that the choice
correspondence is (weakly) increasing as the choice set shrinks when all alternatives chosen
in the larger set are also present in the smaller set. Axiom  states that when two actions
are both chosen in a given set, and one of them is chosen in a larger set that includes the
rst set, then both are chosen in the larger set. Axiom  states that if an action is chosen in
each set in a class of sets, it must be also chosen in their union.4 We show that: (a) choice
data is compatible with a BDP if and only if such data satises both axioms  and , and
(b) choice data is compatible with an admissible5 SDP if and only if such data satises both
axioms  and . Heuristically, axioms  and  imply that choice data are representable by a
binary relation whether or not that relation is transitive (Sen, 1971). To ensure choice data
satisfy transitivity requires that such data satises axioms  and .6 Evidently, whenever
4 In Section 4, Remark 1, we point out that there is a canonical decision scenario in which any decision
scenario in our framework can be embedded. Namely, one where the set of psychological states is the set of
actions and the feedback e¤ect is the identity function. The canonical scenario is, thus, trivially identiable
from choice data.
5We provide a formal denition of an admissible decision problem in Section 4. In short, admissibility
requires the preference relation over consistent pairs of actions and psychological states to be transitive.
6We make this point precise in Section 4.
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axiom  is satised, axiom  implies axiom  but the reverse implication does not always
hold.
Rational choice theory is falsiable if Arrows axiom holds.7 Sen (1971) shows (in
Theorem 3 and 7) that Arrow (1959)s axiom (and hence, WARP and menu independence)
is satised if and only if both Sens axioms  and  are satised. Sens axioms  and
, taken together, are equivalent to Arrows (1959) axiom, which in turn is equivalent to
Samuelsons weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) and menu independence. Axioms
 and  imply that choice data compatible with a BDP rules out pairwise cycles although
such data need not satisfy menu independence or WARP.8 The violation of Arrows axiom
in a BDP comes from the fact that alternatives may not be irrelevant even when they are
never chosen if the DM doesnt fully internalize the endogeneity of psychological states.
Then we ask what sort of information about psychological states can choice reveal in the
presence of behavioral DMs. We show that choice data can be used to identify a "minimal"
and a "maximal" set of psychological states. It is relatively straightforward to note that
when choice data satises axioms  and , no more than one psychological state is required
to rationalize such data as the outcome of a SDP. Under the additional requirement that for
any xed psychological state the (implied) ranking over actions be transitive, we show that
with three or more actions, there exists choice data that satises axioms  and  (but not
axiom ) which requires at least two psychological states in order to be rationalized as the
outcome of a BDP. Note also, that there exists also a set of maximal psychological states-
namely, the set of actions with feedback from actions to psychological states as the identity
map- that can be directly identied from choice data. In this way, we obtain a lower bound
and an upper bound for the set of psychological states that can be identied from choice
data.
Finally, we propose a way to infer "revealed mistakes" in specic decision-scenarios.
Interestingly, our result holds even in scenarios where choice data satisfy both Sens axiom
7Arrows axiom: the choice correspondence remains the same as the choice set shrinks when all alternatives
chosen in the larger set are also present in the smaller set.
8 It turns out that the fact that choice data compatible with a BDP rules out pairwise cycles distinguishes
the specic form of bounded rationality studied here from other axiomatic characterizations of decision-
making models with some specic behavioral avor (see Section 4, Remark 2).
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 and  (and hence, Arrows axiom), thus potentially qualifying the welfare analysis based
on choices alone (e.g. Bernheim and Rangel, 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our framework
with the aid of a simple example. Section 3 develops the general framework together with
a dynamic interpretation and states the existence result. Section 4 provides the axiomatic
characterization of our theory and studies the identication of psychological states and
mistakes from choice data. The last section concludes. The details of the existence proof
and the dynamic interpretation of our framework are contained in the appendix.
2 Example (Addiction)
Consider a DM who is considering whether to drink alcohol. The psychological state will
either be sober (if he does not drink) or inebriated (if he does). The payo¤ table below
provides a quick summary of the decision problem:
inebriated sober
alcohol 1  2 1 + 0
no alcohol 0  2 0 + 0
In this example, the payo¤s are an additive function of the action-based payo¤ and the
psychological state-based payo¤. Alcohol generates utility of 1; no alcohol generates utility
of 0. Sobriety generates utility of 0; inebriation generates utility of  2.
An DM who uses a SDP to solve this problem recognizes that he has to choose between
the on-diagonal elements. Alcohol goes together with the psychological state of inebriation.
No alcohol goes together with the psychological state of sobriety. Hence, the o¤-diagonal
paths are not options.
However, the behavioral DM mistakenly believes that (or at least acts as if) he can
change his alcohol consumption without changing his psychological state. Consequently,
the behavioral DM decides to consume alcohol (since alcohol is always better, conditional
on a xed psychological state) and ends up inebriated (with net payo¤  1). This is a
mistake in the sense that the DM would be better o¤ if he chose to drink no alcohol and
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ended up sober (with net payo¤ 0). In this sense, by using a BDP the DM imposes an
externality on himself. Thus, the outcomes of a BDP can (although not necessarily) be
welfare dominated.
The rest of the paper works out the implications of modelling and characterizing bound-
edly rational decision-making where a DM chooses actions without internalizing their impact
on psychological states.
3 The General Framework
3.1 The Model
The primitives of the model consist of set A of actions, a set P of psychological states and
a function  : A ! P modelling the feedback e¤ect from actions to psychological states.
It is assumed that  (a) is non-empty and single-valued for each a 2 A. A decision state
is a pair of an action and psychological state (a; p) where a 2 A and p 2 P . A consistent
decision state is a decision state (a; p) such that p = (a).
Following Harsanyi (1954), we assume intra-personal comparability of utility. That is,
the DM is not only able to rank di¤erent elements in A for a given p; but he is also able
to assess the subjective satisfaction he derives from an action when the psychological state
is p with the subjective satisfaction he derives from another action when the psychological
state is p0. In other words, we assume that the DM is able to rank elements in AP . This
formulation is critical in order to make meaningful welfare comparisons.
Accordingly, the preferences of the DM are denoted by , a binary relation ranking
pairs of decision states in (A P ) (A P ).
A decision scenario is, thus, a collection D = (A;P; ;).
We study two decision procedures:
1. Given a non-empty feasible set of actions A0  A, a standard decision procedure
(SDP ) is one where the DM chooses a consistent decision state (a; p), a 2 A0 and p =  (a).
The outcomes of a SDP , denoted by S, are
S =

(a; p) : (a; p)   a0; p0 for all  a0; (a0) ; a0 2 A0; p =  (a)	 :
2. Given a non-empty feasible set of actions A0  A, a behavioral decision procedure
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(BDP ) is one where the DM takes as given the psychological state p when choosing a 2 A0.
Dene a preference relation p over A as follows:
a p a0 , (a; p) 
 
a0; p

for p 2 P .
The outcomes of a BDP , denoted by B, are
B =

(a; p) : a p a0 for all a0 2 A0, p = (a)
	
:
In both, SDPs and BDPs, a decision outcome must be a consistent decision state where
the action is chosen from some feasible set of actions. In a SDP, the DM internalizes that
his psychological state is determined by his action via the feedback e¤ect when choosing an
action from the set of feasible actions. In a BDP, the DM takes the psychological state as
given when he chooses an action from the set of feasible actions.
Our framework assumes that psychological states are normatively relevant. Therefore,
the preferences of a standard DM provide the relevant normative benchmark. These norma-
tive preferences  over the set of consistent decision states directly induce a unique ranking
of actions, (a; (a))  (a0; (a0)).
3.2 A Dynamic Interpretation
We interpret the outcomes of a SDP and a BDP as corresponding to distinct steady-states
associated with an adaptive preference mechanism where the DMs preferences over actions
at any t; denoted by pt 1 , depends on his past psychological state where pt is the psycho-
logical state for period t. The statement a pt 1 a0 means that the DM nds a at least as
good as a0, given the psychological state pt 1. The DM takes as given the psychological
state from the preceding period.
Note that an outcome of a BDP corresponds to the steady state of an adjustment
dynamics where the DM is myopic (i.e. does not anticipate that the psychological state at
t+ 1 is a¤ected by the action chosen at t).
Let h(p) = fa 2 A : a p a0, a0 2 Ag. For ease of exposition, assume that h(p) is unique.
Fix a p0 2 P . A sequence of short-run outcomes is determined by the relations at 2 h(pt 1)
8
and pt = (at), t = 1; 2; :::: at each step, the DM chooses a myopic best-response.9 Long-
run outcomes are denoted by a pair (a; p) with p = (a) where a is dened to be the
steady-state solution to the short-run outcome functions i.e. a = h((a)). In other words,
long-run behavior corresponds to the outcome of a BDP.10 In contrast, in a SDP, the DM
is farsighted (i.e. anticipates that the psychological state at t + 1 is a¤ected by the action
chosen at t). The outcome of a SDP is one where a is dened to be the steady state solution
to a 2 a 2 A : a (a) a0, a0 2 A	 and p = (a). In this case, the DM anticipates that p
adjusts to a according to () and taking this into account, chooses a. Note that in this
simple framework, in a SDP the DM instantaneously adjusts to the steady-state outcome
so that p0, the initial psychological state, has no impact on the steady state solution with
farsightedness.11 12
3.3 Reduced Form Representation
Various interpretations can be given to a psychological state p. It can be a reference point,
an expectation, an emotion, mood, aspiration or, more generally, any normatively relevant
feature of the environment that the DM may (mistakenly) not internalize at the moment
the decision is made. Are all of these interpretations consistent with our general theoretical
framework? We argue that the answer is yes.
Our analysis assumes that DMspreferences depend on both current action and psycho-
logical state. In some cases, the action causes the psychological state. This is the case of
a reference point or an emotional state like fear, anxiety or stress that quickly adjusts to
9Under the assumptions required to prove Proposition 1 below (existence), as shown in the appendix,
h() is increasing map of p so that the sequence of short-run outcomes is an (component-wise) increasing
sequence (as by assumption contained in a compact set) and therefore, converges to its supremum which is
necessarily a BDP. So the existence result covers not only cases where a solution to a BDP (equivalently, a
steady-state solution to the myopic preference adjustment mechanism) exists but also ensures that short-run
outcomes converge to a BDP.
10Von Weizsacker (1971), Hammond (1976), Pollak (1978) made a similar point for the case of adaptive
preferences dened over consumption.
11Non-trivial dynamics would be associated with farsighted behavior if underlying preferences or action
sets were time variant.
12 In the appendix we extend our framework to situations that allow DMs (i) to anticipate short-run
psychological states that arise from their actions but not the long-run psychological states, and (ii) to make
partial prediction of changes in psychological states as a function of their chosen actions (i.e. projection bias
introduced by Loewenstein et al., 2003).
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current actions. But in other situations, the psychological state precedes the action, and in
this sense, our denition of consistent decision state is an equilibrium concept. This is
the case where the psychological state concerns expectations, endowments or beliefs.13
For example, in Tversky and Kahneman (1991)s theory of reference-dependent pref-
erences over consumption, a could be a consumption bundle and p is a reference point
(another commodity bundle). If the DM chooses a when the pre-decision reference point is
p, the post-decision reference point shifts to a. In this sense, the model of decision-making
studied here corresponds to a situation where "the reference state usually corresponds to
the decision-makers current state." (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, pp. 1046). Shalev
(2000), Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) and Köszegi (2010) also consider models of endoge-
nous reference-dependent preferences.14 Caplin and Leahy (2001) analysis of anticipatory
feelings is also related to our paper as these can be interpreted as a specic example of a
psychological state.15
By using similar reasoning, it follows that our general framework, unies seemingly
disconnected models in the literature, from situations where the psychological state corre-
sponds to beliefs (Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), emotions (Bracha
and Brown, 2007) and aspirations (Dalton et al., 2010; Heifetz and Minelli, 2006).
Given our interpretation of the outcomes of a SDP and a BDP as corresponding to
distinct steady-states associated with an adaptive preference mechanism, as already argued
our model can be seen as a reduced form representation of adaptive preferences over con-
sumption (Von Weizsacker, 1971; Hammond, 1976 and Pollak, 1978, already referred to
above), the theory of melioration where consumers fail to take into account the e¤ect of
current choices on future tastes (Herrnstein and Prelec, 1991) and projection bias (Loewen-
stein et al., 2003) where a DM tends to exaggerate the degree to which their future tastes
will resemble their current state.16
13A similar notion of equilibrium is proposed by Koszegi (2010) and Geanakopolos et al. (1989).
14Our paper complements this literature by studying the situations in which the DM doesnt internalize
the endogeneity of the reference points and by providing testable restrictions in which actual choice data
can in principle be compared.
15Caplin and Leahy (2001) provide a set of axioms so that the representation of underlying preferences
with anticipatory feeling is possible in an expected utility setting. Given our emphasis on testable restrictions
our axiomatic characterization complements their work.
16Projection bias provides a possible explanation of why DMs may use a BDP instead of a SDP in
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Below we present two further examples that illustrate how our framework encompasses
models of status-quo bias and dynamic inconsistency.
Example 1: Status-quo Bias
Consider a DM who is considering whether to switch to a di¤erent service provider (e.g.
gas and electricity) from his current one. The psychological state (in this case the reference
point) will either be current supplier (if he sticks with the current supplier) or the alternative
supplier (if he makes the change). There are two payo¤ relevant dimensions of choice with
outcome denoted x1 and x2 and preferences u(x) = x1+ v(x1  r1) + x2+ v(x2  r2) where
v() is a Kahneman-Tversky value function with v(z) = z if z  0, v(z) = z;  > 2:5 if
z < 0 and v(0) = 0. The cost of switching is equal to 0:5. The status-quo option is dened
by q = (0; 1) and the alternative option is a = (2; 0). The payo¤ table below provides a
quick summary of the decision problem:
status quo alternative
current supplier 1 2  2
alternative supplier 3:5   1:5
In this example, again, the payo¤s are an additive function of the action-based payo¤
and the psychological state-based payo¤.
A DM who uses a SDP recognizes that he has to choose between the on-diagonal ele-
ments. Sticking with the current supplier goes with the reference point status quo. Choosing
the alternative supplier goes together with the reference point of the alternative. Hence,
the o¤-diagonal paths are not options and the outcome of a SDP will be to switch to the
alternative supplier.
However, the behavioral DM mistakenly believes that (or at least acts as if) he can
choose between the two suppliers without changing his psychological state. Consequently,
there are two payo¤ ranked outcomes: one where the behavioral DM sticks with the current
supplier and the reference point is status-quo and the other where he switches suppliers
and the reference point is the alternative. The former choice is a mistake in the sense that
some particular situations. For example, projection bias can explain why behavioral DMs get trapped in
addiction or overconsumption of durable goods. However, projection bias cannot account for all the models
encompassed in BDPs. This is the case, for instance, for models of cognitive dissonance.
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the DM would be better o¤ if he chose to switch and ended up with the alternative as the
reference point.
Example 2: Dynamic Inconsistency
Consider a three period problem t = 0; 1; 2 where a DM has preferences dened over
a single consumption good ct; t = 0; 1; 2. The DM is endowed with a single unit of the
consumption good at t = 0 but has no endowment of the consumption good in either of the
subsequent two periods. The DM obtains no utility from consumption at t = 0 but obtains
utility from consumption at t = 1; 2 with an instantaneous linear utility function c. Assume
that the DM quasi-hyperbolically discounts the future with 0 <  < 1 and  = 1.
There are two assets: (i) an illiquid asset I where one unit invested yields nothing at
t = 1 and R > 1 units of the consumption good at t = 2, (ii) a liquid asset where one unit
invested at t = 0 yields 1 unit of the consumption good if liquidated at t = 1 and nothing
at t = 2 or if not liquidated at t = 1 yields R0 > R units of the consumption good at t = 2.
We assume that  < 1R0 . The DM at t = 0 will choose which asset to invest in in order to
maximize  (c1 + c2). At t = 1 the current self of the DM will maximize c1 + c2.
To represent this decision problem in our framework we proceed as follows. The psy-
chological states of the DM at t = 0 are p1 ="tempted to liquidate at t = 1" and p2 ="not
tempted to liquidate at t = 1" (corresponding to not liquidate). Note that at t = 1, if L
was chosen at t = 0, the current self of the DM would be tempted and liquidate if R0 < 1
i.e.  < 1R0 . Clearly, the current self of the DM cannot be tempted to liquidate if at t = 0
the DM has invested in the illiquid asset.
Therefore, the action "invest in the illiquid asset" goes with the psychological state
p2 ="not tempted to liquidate at t = 1" while the action "invest in the liquid asset" goes
with the psychological state p1 ="tempted to liquidate at t = 1". The DM at t = 0 has to
decide whether to invest in the liquid or the illiquid asset. A quick summary of his decision
problem at t = 0 is:
tempted not tempted
liquid 1 R0
illiquid R R
12
If the DM follows a SDP, he will correctly anticipate that the asset chosen today will
a¤ect his psychological state at t = 1 and will choose to invest in the illiquid asset and
obtain a payo¤ of R > 1. In a SDP the DM exhibits self-control by using the illiquid asset
as a pre-commitment device. If the DM follows a BDP, he will believe that (or act as if)
the asset chosen today will not a¤ect his psychological state at t = 1. Interestingly, there
is no pure action solution to a BDP. If the psychological state is "tempted", he will choose
to invest in the illiquid but if the psychological state is "not tempted" he will invest in the
liquid asset. There is, however, a random solution where the behavioral DM chooses to
invest in the liquid asset with probability p = R
0 R
R0 1 : if a behavioral DM believes that the
distribution over psychological states is
n
R0 R
R0 1 ;
R 1
R0 1
o
, he is indi¤erent between investing
in either the liquid or the illiquid asset and is willing to randomize between the two actions.
By computation, it is easily checked that the expected payo¤ from such a random action is
less than R; the payo¤ of a standard DM.
3.4 Stackelberg vs. Nash in an Intra-self Game
In a formal sense, we could also interpret the distinction between a SDP and a BDP as
corresponding to the Stackelberg and, respectively, the Nash equilibrium of dual self intra-
personal game where one self chooses actions a and the other self chooses the psychological
state p and (a) describes the best-response of the latter for each a 2 A.
In a Stackelberg equilibrium, the self choosing actions anticipates that the other self
chooses a psychological state according to the function (). In a Nash equilibrium, both
selves take the choices of the other self as given when making its own choices.
Consistent with the dynamic interpretation of the general framework, in the denition
of a SDP, internalization (i.e. rationally anticipating the actual e¤ects of ones actions)
also encompasses the DM anticipating that equilibrium (e.g. ones own actions is what one
expected it to be, or what others expected it to be) and behaving accordingly.
Given this interpretation, it follows that in the welfare analysis reported below, only the
preferences of the self that chooses actions is taken into account.
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3.5 Existence
So far we have implicitly assumed that both SDP and BDP are well-dened i.e. lead to
well dened outcomes. In what follows, we check for the existence of solutions to an SDP
and a BDP in situations where the underlying preferences are not necessarily complete or
transitive and underlying action sets are not necessarily convex.17 So we allow preferences
to be incomplete, non-convex and acyclic (and not necessarily transitive) and we show
existence of a solution to a BDP extending Ghosals (2011) result for normal form games
to behavioral decision problems.18
Proposition 1. Suppose A P  <n <m and the function  : A! P is continuous
and increasing. Under assumptions of single-crossing, quasi-supermodularity and monotone
closure,19 a solution to a BDP exists.
Proof. See appendix. 
The preceding existence result doesnt cover situations with payo¤s as in Example 2
(dynamic inconsistency). In such cases, where there are no pure action solutions to a BDP,
what are the possible outcomes?
Given that the outcome of a BDP can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of a two
person game (as shown in Section 3.4), as long as A and P are nite, a behavioral decision
outcome involving randomization always exists. A di¤erent possibility, referring back to
the dynamic interpretation of model, is that in such situations, the sequence of short-run
outcomes will cycle.
Moreover, under the assumptions required to prove Proposition 1, as shown in the
appendix, h(:) is an increasing map of p so that the sequence of short-run outcomes is a
(component-wise) increasing sequence (as by assumption is contained in a compact set and
therefore, converges to its supremum which is necessarily a BDP). So the existence result
17Mandler (2005) shows that incomplete preferences and intransitivity is required for "status quo mainte-
nance" (encompassing endowment e¤ects, loss aversion and willingness to pay-willingness to accept diversity)
to be outcome rational. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) argue that reference dependent preferences may not
be convex.
18The seminal proof for existence of equilibria with incomplete preferences in Shafer and Sonnenschein
(1975) requires convexity both for showing the existence of an optimal choice and using Kakutanis x-point
theorem.
19These terms are all dened in the appendix.
14
covers not only cases where a solution to a BDP (equivalently, a steady-state solution to the
myopic preference adjustment mechanism) exists, but also ensures that short-run outcomes
converge to a BDP.
4 Axiomatic Characterization of SDP and BDP
Under what conditions can choice data be rationalized as the outcome of a standard or a
behavioral decision procedure? In what follows, we show that both decision procedures are
fully characterized by three observable properties of choice.
Fix ,  : A ! P and a family A of non-empty subsets of A. Dene two correspon-
dences, S and B, from A to A as
S(A0) =

a : (a; p)   a0; p0 for all a0 2 A0, p0 = (a0) and p = (a)	
and
B(A0) = fa : a (a) a0 for all a0 2 A0g;
as the choices corresponding to a standard and behavioral decision procedure, respectively.
We say that S(:) is admissible if the preference relation  is transitive over the set of
consistent decision states. We say that B(:) is admissible if for each p 2 P , p over actions
pairs in A.
Suppose we observe a non-empty correspondence C from A to A such that C(A0)  A0.
We say that SDP (respectively, BDP) rationalizes C if there exist P ,  and  such that
C(A0) = S(A0) (respectively, C(A0) = B(A0)).
Next, consider the following axioms introduced by Sen (1971).
Sens axiom . For all A0; A00  A, if A00  A0 and C(A0) \ A00 is non-empty, then
C(A0) \ A00  C(A00): In words, the choice correspondence is (weakly) increasing as the
choice set shrinks when all alternatives chosen in the larger set are also present in the
smaller set.
Sens axiom . For all A0; A00  A, if A00  A0 and a; a0 2 C(A00), then a 2 C(A0)
if and only if a0 2 C(A0). In words, when two actions are both chosen in a given set, and
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one of them is chosen in a larger set that includes the rst set, then both are chosen in the
larger set.
Sens axiom . Let M be any class of sets fA0k  A : k  1g and let V be the union
of all sets in M . Then any a that belongs to C(A0) for all A0 in M must belong to C(V ).
In words, if an action is chosen in each set in a class of sets, it it must be also be chosen in
their union.
We are now in a position to fully characterize choice data compatible with a SDP and
BDP. We begin by characterizing choice data compatible with an admissible SDP.
Proposition 2. Choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of an admissible SDP if
and only if both Sens axioms  and  are satised.
Proof. (i) We show that if choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of an admissible
SDP, then, both Sens axiom  and  hold. Fix ,  : A! P . For A00  A0  A, if
a 2 S(A0) =
(
a : (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all a0 2 A0, p0 = (a0)
and p = (a)
)
then
a 2 S(A00) =
(
a : (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all a0 2 A00, p0 = (a0)
and p = (a)
)
:
Therefore, S(A0) = C(A0)\A00  C(A00) = S(A00) so that Sens axiom  is satised. Next,
given A00  A0, suppose a0; a00 2 C(A00) = S(A00) but a0 2 S(A0) and a00 =2 S(A0). By
construction, both (a0; p0)  (a00; p00) and (a0; p0)  (a00; p00) for p0 = (a0) and p00 = (a00).
Therefore, by transitivity of  over consistent decision states, a00 2 S(A0), a contradiction
so that Sens axiom  is satised.
(ii) We show that if choice data satisfy Sens axioms  and , they are rationalizable
as the outcome of an admissible SDP. To this end, we specify  : A ! P , #P  1 so
that  is onto. Next we specify preferences : for each non-empty A0  A and a 2 C(A0),
 satises the condition that (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all a0 2 A0, p = (a) and p0 = (a0),
p; p0 2 P . Consider C(A0) for some non-empty A0  A. By construction if a 2 C(A0) )
S(A0) and therefore, C(A0)  S(A0). We need to check that for the above specication
of ,  : A ! P , S(A0)  C(A0). Suppose to the contrary, there exists a0 2 S(A0) but
a0 =2 C(A0). It follows that (a0; (a0))  (b; (b)) for all b 2 A0. Since a0 =2 C(A0), by
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construction this is only possible if for each b 2 A0, a0 2 C(A00b ) with fa; bg  A00b . By
Sens axiom , as a0 2 C(fa; bg) and as fa; bg  A0, again by Sens axiom , b 2 C(fa; bg)
for b 2 C(A0). Now, by construction, A0 = [b2A0 fa; bg. By Sens axiom , a0 2 C(A0).
Therefore, S(A0) = C(A0). Finally, note that when choice data satisfy axioms  and , 
is transitive (Theorem 1, Sen (1971)) and therefore, S(A0) is admissible. 
Rational choice theory is falsiable if Arrows axiom holds. Sen (1971) shows (in The-
orem 3 and 7) that Arrow (1959)s axiom20 (and hence, WARP and menu independence)
is satised if and only if both Sens axioms  and  are satised. So, Proposition 2 implies
that choice data are compatible with SDP if and only if they are also compatible with
rational choice theory.21
Note that we can set #P = 1 in part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 2 so that the set of
minimal psychological states that can be identied from choice data is equal to one if such
data can be rationalized as the outcome of an admissible SDP. Therefore, it is without loss
of generality to assume that psychological states are exogenous to the actions of the DM if
choice data can be rationalized as the outcome of an admissible SDP.
Next, we characterize choice data compatible with a BDP.
Proposition 3. Choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of a BDP if and only if
both Sens axioms  and  are satised.
Proof. (i) We show that if choice data are rationalizable as the outcome of a BDP, then
both Sens  and  hold. Fix ,  : A! P . For A00  A0  A, if
a 2 B(A0) = a : a (a) a0 for all a0 2 A0	
then
a 2 B(A00) = a : a (a) a0 for all a0 2 A00	 :
Therefore, C(A0) \A00  C(A00) as required so that Sens axiom  is satised. Next, let M
20Arrow (1959)s axiom: If A0  A and C(A)\A0 is non-empty, then C(A0) = C(A)\A0:When the set of
feasible alternatives shrinks, the choice from the smaller set consists precisely of those alternatives chosen
in the larger set and remain feasible, if there is any.
21Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)s axiomatic characterization of rational choice with status quo bias (exoge-
nous to the actions chosen by the DM) satises Arrows axiom among other axioms.
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denote a class of sets fA0k  A : k  1g. If
a 2 B(A0k) =

a : a (a) a0 for all a0 2 A0k
	
and V = [k1A0k, it follows that
a 2 B(V ) = a : a (a) a0 for all a0 2 V 	
so that Sens axiom  is satised.
(ii) We show that if choice data satisfy both Sens  and , they are rationalizable as
the outcome of a BDP. To this end, we specify  : A ! P so that #P  1 and  is onto.
Next we specify preferences : for each non-empty A0  A and a 2 C(A0),  satises the
condition that a p a0 for all a0 2 A0 and p = (a). Consider C(A0) for some non-empty
A0  A. By construction if a 2 C(A0), then a 2 B(A0) and therefore, C(A0)  B(A0). We
need to check that for the above specication of ,  : A! P , B(A0)  C(A0). Suppose to
the contrary, there exists a0 2 B(A0) but a0 =2 C(A0). It follows that a0 p0 b for all b 2 A0
and p0 = (a0). Since a0 =2 C(A0), by construction this is only possible if a0 2 C(A00b ) for
some A00b with fa0; bg  A00b . Let A00 = [b2A0A00b . It follows that a0 2 A00 and by Sens axiom
, a0 2 C(A00). As A0  A00 and a0 2 C(A00), by Sens axiom , a0 2 C(A0) a contradiction.
Therefore, B(A0) = C(A0). 
The violation of Arrows axiom in a BDP comes from the fact that alternatives may
not be irrelevant even when they are never chosen if the DM doesnt fully internalize the
endogeneity of psychological states.
Note that in contrast to Proposition 2, Proposition 3 provides an axiomatic charac-
terization of choice data compatible with any BDP whether admissible or not. Evidently,
choice data generated by an admissible BDP will satisfy axioms  and . The following
corollary characterizes a key requirement when choice data compatible with axioms  and
 are rationalized as the outcome of an admissible BDP.
Corollary 1. Choice data satisfying Sens axioms  and  can be rationalized as the
outcome of an admissible BDP if #A  3, #P  2.
Proof. Assume that #P = 1 with P = fpg. Consider the preference relation dened
over actions p where P = fpg and for each non-empty A0  A and a 2 C(A0), p satises
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the condition that a p a0 for all a0 2 A0 and p = (a). Suppose we require that choice
data satisfying axioms  and  have to be rationalized as the outcome of a BDP where
for each p 2 P , p is required to be transitive. Consider A = fa; b; cg, C (fa; b; cg) = fag,
C (fa; bg) = fa; bg, C (fa; cg) = fag, C (fb; cg) = fcg which satises axioms  and  (but
not ). Suppose it is required that this choice data be rationalized as the outcome of a
BDP (i.e. B(A0) = C (A0), A0  A) with #P = 1, with P = fpg where p is transitive.
Then, a p b, a p c, b p a, c p b so that as p is transitive, c p a and therefore,
C (fa; b; cg) = fa; cg, a contradiction. It follows that #P > 1. It also follows that in the
proof part (ii) of Proposition 3, we must have that #P  #A 1 so that whenever #A  3,
#P  2. 
Therefore, if choice data satises axioms  and  and such data is rationalized as the
outcome of a BDP where p is required to be transitive for each p 2 P , then as long as
#A  3, #P  2 so that the assumption that psychological states are endogenous to the
actions of the DM is essential and can be inferred directly from choice data. Without the
additional requirement that choice data satisfying axioms  and  be rationalized as the
outcome of an admissible BDP, it is without loss of generality to set #P = 1 in part (ii) of
the proof of Proposition 3.
Remark 1. (Maximal Psychological States) Is there a maximal collection of psy-
chological states that can be identied from choice data? Two decision scenarios are equiva-
lent if and only if (i) the unique ranking over actions induced by the ranking over consistent
decision states in the two di¤erent decision scenarios is identical (so that these two rankings
are normatively equivalent over actions), and (ii) the ranking over actions, relevant for the
computation of BDP outcomes, is the same in the two decision scenarios (so that the two
rankings are equivalent from a behavioral perspective over actions). Consider a xed deci-
sion scenarioD = (A;P; ;). Consider also the decision scenarioDId: = (A;P = A; Id:; ~)
(Id: denotes the identity function from A to itself) where: (i) (a; a) ~ (a0; a0), (a; (a)) 
(a0; (a0)) for all a; a0 2 A, (ii) (a; a) ~ (a0; a) , (a; (a))  (a0; (a)) for all a; a0 2 A,
with ~ arbitrarily dened otherwise. Then, DId: = (A;P = A; Id:; ~) is, by construction,
equivalent to D = (A;P; ;). Given any decision scenario, there is an equivalent (both
from a normative and behavioral perspective) decision scenario where the set of psycho-
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logical states is the set of actions and the function  is the identity function. Label such
a decision scenario as a maximal decision scenario and P = A as the set of maximal psy-
chological states. Taken together with Corollary 1, we obtain that whenever choice data
(with #A  3) satises axioms  and  and such data is required to be rationalized as the
outcome of an admissible BDP, the number of psychological states that can be identied
from choice data must lie between 2 and #A.
Remark 2. (Related literature) There is an emerging literature that provides ax-
iomatic characterizations of decision-making models with some specic behavioral avor.
Relevant contributions to this literature are Manzini and Mariotti (2007, 2012), Cherepanov
et al. (2008) and Masatlioglu et al. (2012). We argue that a BDP is observationally distin-
guishable from each of these models on the basis of choice data alone. To start with, choice
data consistent with the di¤erent procedures of choice proposed by each of these papers
can account for pairwise cycles, while choice data consistent with BDP cannot: pairwise
cycles of choice are simply inconsistent with Sens axiom  and . For example, suppose
A = fa; b; cg and C(A) = fag, C(fa; bg) = fag, C(fb; cg) = fbg but C(fc; ag) = fcg.
This choice function can be rationalized, for example, by Manzini and Mariottis (2012)
Categorize then Choose (CTC) procedure of choice, but is not consistent with a BDP. The
choice data would be consistent with BDP if, for example, C(fc; ag) = fc; ag. Moreover,
the Rationalized Shortlist Method (RSM) proposed by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) cannot
accommodate menu dependence, whereas a BDP can.
Like us, Masatlioglu et al. (2012) model of Limited Attention allows for violations
of menu independence, but in a form very di¤erent from (and incompatible with) our
characterization of BDP. They dene a consideration set (a subset of the set of feasible
alternatives) and assume that the DM only pays attention to elements in the consideration
set. In their paper revealed preferences are dened as follows: an alternative x is revealed
preferred to y if x is chosen whenever y is present and x is not chosen when y is deleted.
That is, the choice of an alternative from a set should be una¤ected if an element which
is not in the consideration set is deleted. If choice changes when an alternative is deleted,
then the latter alternative was in the consideration set and clearly the chosen alternative
was revealed preferred to it. This is a violation of independence of irrelevant alternatives,
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but in a form that is incompatible with Sens axiom . Such data cannot be rationalized
as an outcome of a BDP, precisely because in a BDP (and also in a SDP), if x is chosen
whenever y is present, x must be chosen when y is deleted.
Remark 3. (Revealed mistakes) Is it possible to infer a conict between choice and
welfare using choice data alone? Here we propose a possible way to do this. Fix A the set of
alternatives and a family A of non-empty subsets of A. Suppose, as before, that we observe
a non-empty correspondence C from A to A such that C(A0)  A0. Consider the following
two scenarios:
Choice Scenario 1, the DM ranks each pair of non-empty subsets A0; A00  A;
Choice Scenario 2, which reveals a ranking over sets of actions in A as follows: for any
A0  A and non-empty C(A0) such that C(A0)  A0, the set C(A0) is said to be weakly
preferred to the set A0=C(A0).
Let R1 denote the binary ranking of pairs of non-empty subsets A0; A00  A revealed
in Choice Scenario 1 and let R2 denote the binary ranking of pairs of non-empty subsets
A0; A00  A revealed in Choice Scenario 2. Clearly R2 is incomplete as might (though,
obviously, not necessarily) R1.
The following proposition examines the conditions under which R1 and R2 coincide
where both are dened and states the welfare implications when the two rankings do not
coincide.
Proposition 4. Suppose R1 and R2 do not necessarily coincide where both are dened.
Then, the DM cannot be choosing in his best interests in one of the two choice scenarios.
Proof. For each A0  A and A00  A0, we say that A00 2 K(A0) i¤A00R1A0 with A00  A0.
Clearly, if the DM is using a SDP in both choice scenarios (respectively, BDP), C(A0) 2
K(A0) so that R1 and R2 must coincide where both are dened. So suppose R1 and R2
do not necessarily coincide where both are dened. It follows that there exists A0  A such
that C(A0) =2 K(A0) i.e. (A0=C(A0))R1A0 but A0R2 (A0=C(A0)) and  (A0=C(A0))R2A0.
As the DM cannot be using a SDP (respectively, BDP) in both choice scenarios assume
that the DM is using a SDP in Choice Scenario 1. Then, C(A0) = B(A0) for all A0 and
C(A0) =2 K(A0) for some A0. Therefore, for some A0  A: (i) there exists a pair of actions
a; a0 2 A0 with a0 2 C(A) but a =2 C(A0), and (ii)  : A! P such that (a;  (a))  (a0;  (a0))
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but both (a0;  (a))  (a;  (a)) and (a0;  (a0))  (a;  (a0)) so that a welfare dominates a0
even though in Choice Scenario 2 the DM chooses a0. Conversely, suppose that the DM is
solving a BDP in Choice Scenario 1. Then, C(A0) = S(A0) for all A0 and C(A0) =2 K(A0)
for some A0. Therefore, for some A0  A: (i) there exists a pair of actions a; a0 2 A0 with
a0 2 C(A0) but a =2 C(A0), and (ii)  : A ! P such that (a0;  (a0))  (a;  (a)) but both
(a;  (a0))  (a0;  (a0)) and (a;  (a))  (a0;  (a)) but so that a0 welfare dominates a even
though in Choice Scenario 1 the DM chooses a. 
The following example claries the intuition behind Proposition 4. If a is smoking and
a0 is not-smoking, fa0g is a situation in which the option of smoking is not available, and
the only available option is "not-smoking" (i.e. go for dinner to a non-smoking restaurant)
whereas fag is a situation in which the option of "not-smoking" is not available and the only
available option is to smoke (i.e. go for dinner to a restaurant that only admits smokers).22
In Choice Scenario 1, the DM is asked to choose between a situation where only action a
is available and another one where only action a0 is available i.e. between fag and fa0g. In
Choice Scenario 2, the DM is asked to choose between the two actions used in the preceding
pairwise comparison when both actions are available, i.e. actions in fa; a0g for each such
pair of actions. For example, choose between smoking and not smoking over dinner in a
restaurant where both choices are available.23 Proposition 4 says that whenever observed
choices in the two scenarios are inconsistent, then the DMs observed choice in one of the
two choice scenarios is welfare dominated.24
It is of interest to note that if DM is behavioral, Proposition 4 could hold even in those
cases where choice data satises both Sens axiom  and  (and hence, Arrows axiom).
This, at least, potentially qualies the limits of a welfare analysis that is based solely on
choice as in Bernheim and Rangel (2009).
22This type of scenarios could exist, for example, if there is a law that gives the option to owners of
restaurants to decide whether to have "smoke free restaurants", i.e. fa0g or "smoke friendly restaurants",
i.e. fag:
23This type of scenario can exist before the implementation of the law we referred to in the previous
footnote.
24For a related but complementary approach to the construction of a measure of rationality and welfare
see Apesteguia and Ballester (2011).
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5 Concluding Remarks
Unlike much existing work that focuses on a specic behavioral procedure of choice to
predict some specic behavior, this paper focuses on what choices can tell us when we
allow for behavioral decision-making in a general framework. We provide an axiomatic
characterization of the choice theoretical structure of a large set of seemingly disconnected
behavioral procedures. We show that it is possible to identify a minimal and a maximal
set of psychological states using choice data alone, and that under specic choice scenarios,
"revealed mistakes" can be inferred directly from choice data.
Although it is not our main focus here, this paper sheds some light on the understanding
of the normative implications of behavioral economics. Our axiomatic characterization has
indeed normative implications. If choice data satisfy Sens axioms  and  but violate
Arrows axiom, then typically these data are generated by a DM who is not necessarily
choosing in his best interest. Moreover, the DM can be systematically choosing against
his best interest even if choice data satisfy Arrows axiom (as the example of addiction in
Section 2 shows). We also show that, in principle, it is possible to infer the divergence of
choice and welfare based on choice data alone, although this can be done in very limited
settings.
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5.1 Appendix 1: the dynamic interpretation
Predicting short-run, but not long-run, psychological states
So far we have assumed that DMs fail to anticipate that their future psychological state
depend on their current choices including the immediate future. We will now extend our
framework to situations where DMs may anticipate short-run psychological states that arise
from their actions but not the long-run psychological states.
Let h2(p) = h ((h(p))) and dene ht (p) = h
 
(ht 1(p))

iteratively t = 1; 2; :::. Fix a
p0 2 P . A sequence of short-run outcomes compatible with T -period (for some xed, nite
T  1) forecasting is determined by the relations at 2 hT (pt 1) and pt = (at), t = 1; 2; ::::
at each step, the DM chooses a best-response that anticipates the short-run psychological
states within a T -period horizon.
Long-run outcomes compatible with T -period forecasting are denoted by a pair a0; p0
with p0 = (a0) and a0 is dened to be the steady-state solution to the short-run outcome
function i.e. a0 = hT ((a0)).
It follows that long-run behavior corresponds to the outcome of a BDP where the feed-
back e¤ect is dened to be 0(a) = (hT 1(a)).
Partial prediction
Next, we extend our framework to situations where DMs may make partial prediction
of changes in psychological states as a function of their chosen actions. There are many
di¤erent ways of modelling partial prediction. We adopt a simple approach: we will assume
that each decision maker predicts that the psychological state will respond to their chosen
actions with probability q, 0  q  1. It will be convenient at this point to assume
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that the binary relation  has a (expected) utility representation u : A  P ! <. Let
v(a) = u(a; (a)).
Let h(p; q) = fa 2 A : a 2 argmaxa2A qv(a) + (1  q)u(a; p)g. In what follows, we will
assume that that h(p; q) is unique.
Fix a p0 2 P . A sequence of short-run outcomes is determined by the relations at 2
h(pt 1; q) and pt = (at), t = 1; 2; :::: at each step, the DM chooses a myopic best-response.
Long-run outcomes are denoted by a pair a; p with p = (a) and a is dened to be the
steady-state solution to the short-run outcome functions i.e. a = h((a); q).
It follows that long-run behavior corresponds to the outcome of a BDP where the prefer-
ences are represented by a utility function w(a; p) = qv(a)+(1 q)u(a; p). This formulation
is formally equivalent to the modelling of projection bias in Loewenstein et al. (2003).
Note that the above representation is consistent with incomplete learning: as long as the
DM doesnt fully learn to internalize the feedback e¤ect from actions to psychological states,
there is a way of relabelling variables so that the steady-state preferences corresponding to
an adaptive preference mechanism are the outcomes of a BDP.
6 Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 125
Recall that the preferences of the DM is denoted by  a binary relation ranking pairs of
decision states in (A P ) (A P ). As the focus is on incomplete preferences, in this sec-
tion, instead of working with , we nd convenient to specify two other preference relations,
 and . The expression f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2 is written as (a; p)  (a0; p0) and is to be read
as "(a; p) is strictly preferred to (a0; p0) by the DM". The expression f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2 is
written as (a; p)  (a0; p0) and is to be read as "(a; p) is indi¤erent to (a0; p0) by the DM".
Dene
(a; p)  (a0; p0), either (a; p)  (a0; p0) or (a; p)  (a0; p0):
Once  is dened in this way, the results obtained in the preceding sections continue to
apply. In what follows, we do not require either  or  or  to be transitive.
25The seminal proof for existence of equilibria with incomplete preferences in Shafer and Sonnenschein
(1975) requires convexity both for showing the existence of an optimal choice and using Kakutanis x-point
theorem.
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Suppose  is
(i) acyclic i.e. there is no nite set

(a1; p1); :::; (aT ; pT )
	
such that (at 1; pt 1)  (at; pt),
t = 2; :::; T , and (aT ; pT )  (a1; p1), and
(ii)  1 (a; p) = f(a0; p0) 2 A P : (a; p)  (a0; p0)g is open relative to A P i.e.  has
an open lower section26.
Suppose both A and P are compact. Then, by Bergstrom (1975), it follows that S is
non-empty.
Dene
a p a0 , (a; p)  (a0; p):
The preference relation pis a map, : P ! A  A. If  is acyclic, then for p 2 P , pis
also acyclic. If  has an open lower section, then  1p (a) = fa0 2 A : a  a0g is also open
relative to A i.e. p has an open lower section. In what follows, we write a0 =2p (a) as
a p a0 and a0 2p (a) as a0 p a.
Dene a map 	 : P ! A, where 	(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) = ?g: for each p 2 P , 	(p) is
the set of maximal elements of the preference relation p.
We make the following additional assumptions:
(A1) A is a compact lattice;
(A2) For each p, and a; a0, (i) if inf(a; a0) p a, then a0 p sup(a; a0) and (ii) if
sup (a; a0) p a then a0 p inf (a; a0) (quasi-supermodularity);
(A3) For each a  a0 and p  p0, (i) if a0 p0 a then a0 p a and (ii) if a p a0 then
a p0 a0 (single-crossing property)27
(A4) For each p and a  a0, (i) if p (a0) = ? and a0 p a, then p (a) = ? and (ii) if
p (a) = ? and a p a0, p (a0) = ? (monotone closure).
Assumptions (A2)-(A3) are quasi-supermodularity and single-crossing property dened
by Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
26The continuity assumption, that  has an open lower section, is weaker than assuming that that prefer-
ences have both open upper and lower sections (Debreu (1959)), which in turn is weaker than the assumption
that preferences have open graphs. Note that assuming  has an open lower section is consistent with 
being a lexicographic preference ordering over A P .
27For any two vectors x; y 2 <K , the ussual component-wise vector ordering is dened as follows: x  y
if and only if xi  yi for each i = 1; ::;K, and x > y if and only if both x  y and x 6= y, and x y if and
only if xi > yi for each i = 1; ::;K.
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Assumption (A4) is new. Consider a pair of actions such that the rst action is greater
(in the usual vector ordering) than the second action. For a xed p, suppose the two actions
are unranked by p. Then, assumption (A4) requires that either both actions are maximal
elements for por neither is.
The role played by assumption (A4) in obtaining the monotone comparative statics
with incomplete preferences is claried in Ghosal (2011) who also shows that assumptions
(A1)-(A4), taken together, are su¢ cient to ensure that 	(p) is non-empty and compact and
monotone in p i.e. for p  p0 if a 2 	1(p) and a0 2 	1(p0), then sup (a; a0) 2 	1(p) and
inf (a; a0) 2 	1(p0).
To complete the proof of Proposition 1, dene a map 	 : A  P ! A  P , 	(a; p) =
(	1(p);	2(a)) as follows: for each (a; p), 	1(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) = g and 	2(a) =  (a).
It follows that 	1(p) is a compact (and consequently, complete) sublattice of A and has a
maximal and minimal element (in the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by
a(p) and a(p) respectively. By assumption 1, it also follows that for each a,  (a) has a
maximal and minimal element (in the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by
(a) and (a) respectively. Therefore, the map (a(p); (a)) is an increasing function from
AP to itself and as AP is a compact (and hence, complete) lattice, by applying Tarskis
x-point theorem, it follows that (a; p) = (a(p); (a)) is a x-point of 	 and by a symmetric
argument, (a(p); (a)) is an increasing function from AP to itself and  a; p =  a(p); (a)
is also a x-point of 	; moreover, (a; p) and
 
a; p

are respectively the largest and smallest
x-points of 	.
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